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Summary 
The projected impact of compositional verification research conducted by the National Aeronautic 
and Space Administration System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies on aviation safety risk was 
assessed. Software and compositional verification was described. Traditional verification techniques have 
two major problems: testing at the prototype stage where error discovery can be quite costly and the 
inability to test for all potential interactions leaving some errors undetected until used by the end user. 
Increasingly complex and nondeterministic aviation systems are becoming too large for these tools to 
check and verify. Compositional verification is a “divide and conquer” solution to addressing increasingly 
larger and more complex systems. A review of compositional verification research being conducted by 
academia, industry, and Government agencies is provided. Forty-four aviation safety risks in the Biennial 
NextGen Safety Issues Survey were identified that could be impacted by compositional verification and 
grouped into five categories: automation design; system complexity; software, flight control, or 
equipment failure or malfunction; new technology or operations; and verification and validation. One 
capability, 1 research action, 5 operational improvements, and 13 enablers within the Federal Aviation 
Administration Joint Planning and Development Office Integrated Work Plan that could be addressed by 
compositional verification were identified.  
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Public benefits resulting from continued growth in the air transport of passengers and cargo depend 
on improvements in the inherent safety features of current and future aircraft that will operate in the Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) is 
addressing this challenge by conducting foundational research and developing innovative tools, concepts, 
and technologies to overcome the growing demands and problems that will be created by the nation’s 
transition to NextGen.  
The System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies (SSAT) project, part of the AvSP, will identify 
risks and provide knowledge required to safely manage increasingly complex aircraft design and 
operation, and the air transportation system. The SSAT project is focused on methods to assess and 
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ensure complex aviation system-wide safety for the NextGen by addressing the following four technical 
challenges (TCs): 
 
TC1: Assurance of flight critical systems: Fill a critical gap in life-cycle development of complex 
systems for NextGen by developing verification and validation (V&V) techniques that prove that new 
technologies envisioned for NextGen are as safe, or safer than, the current system and by providing a 
cost-effective basis for assurance and certification of complex civil aviation systems by fiscal year 
(FY) 2025. 
 
TC2: Discovery of safety incidents: Discover the precursors to aviation safety incidents through 
automated mining of massive heterogeneous data sets to enable proactive risk management by 
FY 2019. 
 
TC3: Automation design tools: Enable development of robust human-automation systems by 
incorporating known human performance limitations into analysis tools by FY 2020. 
 
TC4: Prognostic algorithm design of safety assurance: Explore processes (including algorithm 
design) for verifiability of system health management algorithms, thus removing obstacles to 
certification while enabling their deployment by industry to take advantage of their safety benefits by 
FY 2025. 
 
This study is focused on a portion of the research being conducted under TC1, specifically, 
compositional verification. The research goal is to demonstrate that V&V of complex systems can be 
derived through decomposition from V&V results on system components. This will have an impact on 
scalability, reuse, and system evolution (Ref. 1). 
1.2 Objectives 
The primary objective of systems analysis is to provide information to the SSAT management team 
regarding the projected impact of the SSAT research portfolio on its aviation safety goals with particular 
attention paid to the system-wide analyses of the air transportation system. This objective is achieved 
through: (1) statistical analyses, (2) qualitative portfolio analyses, (3) high-level systems analyses, and 
(4) external collaboration. All of these analyses will assist the SSAT project team in prioritizing and 
adjusting the SSAT portfolio throughout the life of the project (Ref. 1). 
To assist the management in achieving this objective, several systems analysis milestones have been 
specified in the SSAT project plan (Ref. 1). The systems analysis milestone addressed in this study is 
focused on compositional verification research contained within TC1. Specifically, this study will assess 
the projected impact of the implementation of compositional verification on current and future aviation 
safety risk using a combination of high-level and qualitative systems analyses.  
The study has four components:  
 
(1) Summarized software verification and more specifically compositional verification 
(2) Reviewed compositional verification research being conducted by academia, industry, and 
Government agencies 
(3) Identified current and future safety risks compiled in the Biennial NextGen Safety Issues Survey 
(BNSIS) Database (Ref. 2) that could be impacted by the implementation of compositional verification 
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(4) Identified Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) operational improvements (OIs), 
enablers, research actions (RAs), development plans, and policy issues that are directly related to 
compositional verification 
2.0 Compositional Verification Research 
2.1 Verification of Flight-Critical Systems 
Software verification assures that the software fully satisfies expected requirements. Various software 
verification methods include: 
 
Testing using different scenarios—may be enough for conventional software, but falls short for 
complex systems software (Ref. 3). 
Run-time monitoring—typically requires little computing resources, but can produce uncertain 
results and false negatives. 
Theorem proving—occurs during the requirements phase and involves a lot of analyst effort and 
skill, and is mostly limited to a few academic studies (Ref. 4). 
Model checking—used during the software development requirements and design phases. This 
approach advocates automatically checking software for specific design flaws. The biggest problem 
with model checking today is the state explosion problem (the number of states of even a relatively 
small system is often far greater than can be handled in a realistic computer). 
Static analysis—explores the structure of the source code without execution.  
Compositional verification—refer to the descriptions below. 
2.2 Compositional Verification 
Traditional verification techniques of testing and simulation have two major problems: testing at the 
prototype stage where error discovery can be quite costly, and the inability to test for all potential 
interactions leaves some errors undetected until use by the end user (flight crew) (Ref. 5). Formal 
software verification techniques such as model checking are useful in detecting errors, however, 
increasingly complex and nondeterministic aviation systems are becoming too large for these tools to 
verify (Ref. 6). One solution is the “divide and conquer” strategy used by compositional verification 
(Ref. 7). Larger and more complex systems are divided into smaller components (models) and are verified 
separately. The smaller components are then recombined and verified by checking the assumptions about 
the environment, guarantees provided by the components, and facts provided by design patterns (Ref. 8).  
Compositional verification research is being conducted by academia, industry, research laboratories, 
and Government agencies. Table 1 to Table 4 show some of the recent research published (1997 to 2012) 
by research institutes, academia, industry, and Government agencies. The majority was performed by a 
wide range of academic institutions, NASA, and the Research Institute for Advanced Computer Science 
(RIACS), a close collaborator with NASA. 
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3.0 Compositional Verification Impact on Aviation Safety 
Events that impact safety caused by unintended or unforeseen software failures and unanticipated 
behaviors have already occurred. In a final report regarding Qantas Flight 72 in 2008 where 110 people 
were injured, Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigators found that a programming error was partly 
to blame after a computer component failed. The airplane software was not written to handle a specific 
event in which an air data inertial reference unit produced erroneous data at regular intervals (Ref. 9). 
“Because the behavior of complex systems is increasingly controlled by software, software can have a 
significant impact on safety and reliability” (Ref. 10). For a qualitative look at the possible impacts that 
compositional verification might have on current and future aviation safety risk, the SSAT Systems 
Analysis Team identified any relevant safety issues in the recently published BNSIS (Ref. 2). 
3.1 Biennial NextGen Safety Issues Survey  
The JPDO Safety Working Group conducted the BNSIS (Ref. 2) to identify current and future safety 
issues for updating the National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan (Ref. 11). Stakeholders were asked what 
their five most current and future safety concerns were. These stakeholders included more than 330 
subject matter experts in the global aviation community senior managers, operators, maintenance 
personnel, researchers, designers, manufacturers, service providers, regulators, as well as members of 
standard setting organizations, government-industry groups, and industry and labor associations.  
The survey was completed by 102 subject matter experts. The SSAT Systems Analysis Team 
reviewed the survey database to identify those safety concerns that could be related to compositional 
verification and those that could be positively impacted by compositional verification. Of the 816 safety 
concerns cited, 44 were identified as possibly being impacted by the implementation of compositional 
verification.  
A variety of safety issues, 22 current and 27 future, that could be impacted by compositional 
verification, were cited and organized into the following five categories: 
 
• Automation design 
• System complexity 
• Software, flight control, or equipment failure or malfunction 
• New technology or operations 
• Verification and validation 
Table 5 to Table 13 provide details about the respondents’ current and future safety issues and 
descriptions. Table 14 shows the number of current and future NextGen safety issues by category that 
could be impacted by compositional verification.  
3.1.1 Automation Design 
Table 5 and Table 6 show the five current and future safety issues associated with automation design. 
Automation is the allocation of functions to machines that would otherwise be allocated to humans. The 
term is also used to refer to the machines that perform those functions. Flight deck automation, therefore, 
consists of machines on the commercial transport aircraft flight deck which perform functions otherwise 
performed by pilots. Current flight deck automation includes autopilots, flight management systems, 
electronic flight instrument systems, and warning and alerting systems” (Ref. 12). Automation may work 
well under normal conditions but, due to design limitations, may not have the desired behavior under 
unusual conditions, such as those close to the operating margins of its operating envelope (Ref. 13).  
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Subject matter experts’ concern for the future include inadequate software tools, systems not failing 
“eloquently,” the increasing reliance on software to operate properly, the need for increased analytic 
capabilities, and the vulnerability to hacking.  
3.1.2 System Complexity  
Table 7 shows the eight current safety issues and Table 8 shows the six future safety issues associated 
with system complexity. Virtually all software on aircraft today is growing in size and complexity. This 
rapid growth poses a serious challenge in the ability to verify the reliability of these complex safety-
critical software systems (Ref. 14). 
Compositional verification is a method for assuring the safety of these flight critical systems. The 
issues cited in the BNSIS include inadequate design assurance and risks associated with increasingly 
complex systems where errors have not always been identified before use of the software on aircraft in an 
operational environment. An example is seen in a 2006 incident involving an Airbus 340–642. A data bus 
failure to monitor fuel levels and flow caused one engine to lose power and another to fluctuate. Faulty 
software logic prevented a working backup computer from being selected (Ref. 15).  
3.1.3 Software, Flight Control, or Equipment Failure or Malfunction  
Table 9 shows the seven current safety issues and Table 10 shows the two future safety issues 
associated with software, flight control, or equipment failure or malfunction. While Table 5 to Table 8 
cite automation design and system complexity as underlying causes, Table 9 and Table 10 cite failures 
without causes. These failures and malfunctions may have been related to software errors that were not 
detected during the verification process. Compositional verification could find these errors more cost 
effectively before pilots are confronted by potential failures. 
3.1.4 New Technology or Operations  
Table 11 shows the six future safety issues associated with the introduction of new technology or 
operations. Like software, flight control, or equipment failure or malfunction, this new technology or 
operations category does not cite specific causes. Only the difficulty of conducting adequate safety 
assurance process and the lack of knowledge regarding possible impacts of new technology or operations 
implementation are mentioned.  
3.1.5 Verification and Validation 
Finally, Table 12 shows the six current safety issues and Table 13 shows the eight future safety issues 
related to V&V. Verification in general and also as a part of the software safety assurance process is a key 
portion of the design and development of safe aircraft operations. Development of new V&V capabilities 
will provide new safety assurance capabilities for current generation aviation software, which has been 
implicated in anomalous in-flight behavior (Ref. 7). The current and future safety issues identified stress 
the importance of large complex systems.  
3.1.6 Biennial NextGen Safety Issues Survey Summary 
The 44 BNSIS safety issues that could be impacted by the implementation of compositional 
verification are grouped together in categories and include those shown in Table 14. The most frequently 
cited safety issues that could be impacted by compositional verification were in the system complexity, 
and the V&V categories. 
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3.2 Joint Planning and Development Office Integrated Work Plan  
The FAA JPDO released its latest Integrated Work Plan (IWP) in 2011. ‟The IWP supports the 
collaborative planning and deliberation required among partners and stakeholders to prioritize needs, 
establish commitments, coordinate efforts, and focus resources on the work needed to achieve NextGen.” 
(Ref. 16). Capabilities, OIs, RAs, and enablers needed to achieve the FY2025 NextGen vision as defined 
in the Concept of Operations listed in the IWP (Ref. 17). Systems analysts reviewed the capabilities, OIs, 
RAs, and enablers and identified those that could be addressed by compositional verification. 
3.2.1 Capabilities 
The JPDO ‟Improved safety operations” capability directly relates to compositional verification 
specifically in the area of safety assurance techniques that are consistent and compatible with national and 
international regulations, standards, and procedures. This capability ensures safety considerations are 
fully integrated throughout the air transportation system by increasing collaboration and sharing 
information, improving automation (e.g., decision support systems), performing prognostic safety risk 
analysis, and promoting enhanced safety and assurance techniques that are consistent and compatible with 
national and international regulations, standards, and procedures. 
3.2.2 Research Actions 
The JPDO RA R–1440, ‟Applied Research on Complex Systems Validation and Verification,” 
directly relates to the need for compositional verification methods and algorithms that go beyond those 
for less complex systems. Complex systems provide multiple functions that support many different 
operating models, environments, and technologies and therefore, require more advanced and integrated 
methods. Research will support development of complex systems, their risk assessment, and eventual 
certification decisions. 
3.2.3 Operational Improvements 
OIs describe either an operational transformation or the improved level of performance needed to 
achieve the FY2025 NextGen vision, defined in the JPDO concept of operations (Ref. 17). Compositional 
verification directly relates to the five JPDO OIs shown in Table 15.  
OI–3004, ‟Improved operational processes using safety management systems (SMS),” addresses 
equipment certification. Certifying increasingly complex, integrated modular avionics architectures will 
require new verification techniques such as compositional verification (Ref. 18). OI–3102, improved 
safety for NextGen evolution, addresses the need for improved V&V techniques that directly support 
certification of new complex systems. OI–3104, “Enhanced safety of airborne systems,” addresses aircraft 
reliability, an area directly addressed by compositional verification. OI–3105, ‟Enhanced safety of 
ground-based systems,” addresses the reliability of ground-based systems, and OI–3018, ‟Improved SMS 
standards and effectiveness,” applies to safety assurance practices. Compositional verification addresses 
both OI–3105 and EN-3108.  
3.2.4 Enablers 
Enablers are material or nonmaterial solutions that support an improved level of performance in an OI 
or another enabler (Ref. 17). The 12 JPDO enablers presented in Table 16 address a variety of safety 
assurance methods, improved fault management, advances in V&V, increased reliability, and system 
health management in both vehicle and groundbased systems. Compositional verification addresses these 
12 enablers. Enablers related to OIs are also presented in Table 14.  
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3.2.5 Joint Planning and Development Office Summary 
The JPDO IWP was reviewed to identify elements that could be impacted by the implementation of 
compositional verification. Of these, one capability, one research action, five operational improvements, 
and thirteen enablers were identified that could be impacted by the compositional verification. A 
summary of these elements is presented in Table 17. 
4.0 Discussion and Conclusions 
This analysis presented an overview of the variety of methods available for software verification: 
testing, run-time monitoring, theorem proving, model checking, static analysis, and compositional 
verification. Traditional verification techniques have two major problems: testing at the prototype stage 
where error discovery can by quite costly and the inability to test for all potential interactions leaving 
some errors undetected until use by the end user (flight crew). Increasingly complex and nondeterministic 
aviation systems being checked are becoming too large for these tools to verify. Compositional 
verification is a “divide and conquer” solution to addressing increasingly larger and more complex 
systems by dividing systems into smaller components and verifying them separately. The components are 
then recombined and verified by checking the environmental assumptions. 
Compositional verification research has been conducted by academia, research institutes, industry, 
and Government agencies across the world. The majority of this research today has been conducted by a 
wide range of academic institutions and the collaboration between the Research Institute for Advanced 
Computer Science (RIACS) and NASA. 
Because the behavior of complex systems is increasingly controlled by software, software could have 
a more significant impact on safety and reliability. The Biennial NextGen Safety Issues Survey was 
reviewed to identify current and future safety issues that could be impacted by the successful 
implementation of compositional verification. The survey was completed by 102 subject matter experts 
resulting in 816 distinct current and future aviation safety issues. Of these, 44 were identified as having 
the possibility of being impacted by the implementation of compositional verification. These safety issues 
were grouped together in categories:  
 
• Automation design 
• System complexity 
• Software, flight control or equipment failure or malfunction 
• New technology or operations 
• Verification and validation 
 
The most frequently cited safety issues were in the system complexity and the V&V categories. 
The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) Integrated Work Plan (IWP) capabilities, 
operational improvements (OIs), research actions (RAs), and enablers were reviewed to identify those 
that could be impacted by the implementation of compositional verification. Of these, 1 capability, 1 RA, 
5 OIs, and 13 enablers were identified that could be impacted by the implementation of compositional 
verification.  
If compositional verification can be successfully implemented, it could help verify and validate large 
complex systems. Compositional verification has also been found to address a wide variety of identified 
current and potential future safety issues, as well as JPDO IWP elements.  
  
NASA/TM—2014-217877 8 
 
TABLE 1.—RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS BY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
Institute Title Author Forum 
RIACa Automated Assume-Guarantee 
Reasoning by Abstraction 
Refinement 
Mihaela Gheorghiu Bobaru, 
Corina Pasareanu, Dimitra 
Giannakopoulou 
20th International Conference on 
Computer-Aided Verification, July 2008, 
Princeton, New Jersey 
RIAC Composing Safety Systems John Rushby 8th International Symposium on Formal 
Aspects of Component Software, 
September 2011, Oslo, Norway 
RIAC Modular Certification John Rushby CSL Technical Report, funded by NASA, 
DARPA, and Honeywell,  
June 2002 
RIAC Component Verification with 
Automatically Generated 
Assumptions 
Dimitra Giannakopoulou Journal of Software Engineering,  
July 2005 
RIAC A Robust Compositional 
Architecture for Autonomous 
Systems 
Guillaume Brat, Ewen 
Denney, Kimberley Farrell, 
Dimitra Giannakopoulou, Ari 
Jonsson, Jeremy Frank, Mark 
Boddy, Todd Carpenter, Tara 
Estlin, Mihail Pivtoraiko 
Aerospace Conference, IEEE 2006, 
March 2006, Big Sky, Montana 
RIAC Learning Assumptions for 
Compositional Verification 
Jamieson Cobleigh, Dimitra 
Giannakopoulou, Corina 
Pasareanu 
TACAS'03 Proceedings of the 9th 
international conference on Tools and 
algorithms for the construction and 
analysis of systems, April 2003, Warsaw, 
Poland 
National Institute of 
Aerospace 
Compositional Verification of a 
Communication Protocol for a 
Remotely Operating Vehicle 
Cesar Munoz, Alwyn Goodloe 14th International Workshop of Formal 
Methods for Industrial Critical Systems, 
November 2009, Eindhoven, The 
Netherlands 
aaResearch Institute for Advanced Computer Science 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.—RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS BY ACADEMIA 
University or college Title Author Forum 
Georgia Institute of 
Technology 
A complete compositional 
reasoning framework for the 
efficient verification of 
pipelined machines 
Panagiotis Manolios  ICCAD-2005, International Conference 
on Computer-Aided Design, November 
2005, San Jose, California 
University of Illinois Compositional Verification of 
Architectural Models, 
presentation 
Lui Sha Safe & Secure Systems & Software 
Symposium AFRL, June 2012, Fairborn, 
Ohio 
University of Minnesota Compositional Verification of 
Architectural Models, 
presentation 
Michael Whalen Safe & Secure Systems & Software 
Symposium AFRL, June 2012, Fairborn, 
Ohio 
West Virginia 
University 
A Component-based Approach 
to Verification and Validation of 
Formal Software Models 
Dejan Desovski Dissertation, 2006 
Oxford University, 
Oxford, England 
Compositional Verification of 
Probabilistic Systems Using 
Learning 
Lu Feng, Marta Kwiatkowska, 
David Parker 
7th International Conference on 
Quantitative Evaluation of Systems, 
September 2010, Williamsburg, Virginia 
University of 
Manchester, 
Manchester, England 
Component Verification with 
Automatically Generated 
Assumptions 
Howard Barringer Journal of Software Engineering,  
July 2005 
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TABLE 2.—RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS BY ACADEMIA 
University or college Title Author Forum 
University of Toronto, 
Toronto, Canada 
Automated Assume-Guarantee 
Reasoning by Abstraction 
Refinement 
Mihaela G. Bobara 20th International Conference on 
Computer-Aided Verification, July 2008, 
Princeton, New Jersey 
University of 
Kaiserslautern, 
Kaiserslautern, 
Germany 
Compositional Reasoning I 
Model-Based Verification of 
Adaptive Embedded Systems 
Ina Schaefer, Arnd Poetzsch-
Heffter 
6th IEEE Conference on Software 
Engineering and Formal Methods, 
November 2008, Cape Town, South 
Africa 
Univ. des Saarlandes, 
Saarbrucken, Germany 
Synthesizing certificates in 
networks of timed automata 
H. Peter, B. Finkbeiner 2008 Real-Time Systems Symposium, 
Nov. 30 to Dec. 3, 2008, Barcelona, 
Spain 
Vrije Universiteit, 
Amsterdam, 
Netherlands 
Compositional Verification of 
Knowledge-Based Systems: a 
case study in Diagnostic 
Reasoning 
Frank Cornelissen, Catholijn 
Jonker 
10th European Workshop on Knowledge 
Acquisition, Modeling and Management,  
October 1997, Catalonia, Spain 
Verimag Academic 
Research Center, 
Grenoble, France 
Compositional Verification for 
Component Based Systems and 
Application 
S. Bensalem, M. Bozga, T.-H. 
Nguyen, J. Sifakis 
IET Software, Volume 4, Issue 3, June 
2010, p. 181-183  
Charles University, 
Prague, Czech Republic 
Assume-Guarantee Verification 
of Software Components in 
SOFA 2 Framework 
P. Parizek IET software, Volume 4, Issue 3, June 
2010, p. 210-221. 
University of Lugano, 
Lugano, Switzerland 
Interface Decomposition for 
Service Compositions 
Domenico Bianculli; Dimitra 
Giannakopoulou, Corina S. 
Pasareanu 
Software Engineering (ICSE), 2011 33rd 
International Conference on IEEE, 2011, 
Waikiki, Honolulu 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.—RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS BY INDUSTRY 
Company Title Author Forum 
WW Technology 
Group, Ellicott City, 
Maryland 
Compositional Verification of 
Architectural Models, 
presentation 
Chris Walter, Brian LaValley Safe & Secure Systems and Software 
Symposium, AFRL, June 2012, Fairborn, 
Ohio 
Fujitsu Labs, 
Sunnyvale, California 
Environment Generation for 
Validating Event-Driven 
Software Using Model 
Checking 
O. Tkachuk IET Software, Volume 4, Issue 3, June 
2010, p. 194-2009 
Rockwell Collins, 
Minneapolis-St Paul, 
Minnesota 
Compositional Verification of 
Architectural Models 
[presentation] 
Darren Cofer, Steven Miller, 
Andrew Gacek 
Safe & Secure Systems and Software 
Symposium, AFRL, June 2012, Fairborn, 
Ohio 
Smart Information Flow 
Technologies, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Prismatic: Unified Hierarchical 
Probabilistic Verification tool 
David Musliner, Eric 
Engstrom 
Final Report to DARPA and AFRL, 
September 2011, Report number AFRL-
RZ-WP-TR-2011-2097 
Adventium Enterprises, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
A Robust Compositional 
Architecture for Autonomous 
Systems 
Guillaume Brat, Ewen 
Denney, Kimberley Farrell, 
Dimitra Giannakopoulou,  
Ari Jonsson, Jeremy Frank, 
Mark Boddy, Todd Carpenter, 
Tara Estlin, Mihail Pivtoraiko 
Aerospace Conference, IEEE 2006, 
March 2006, Big Sky, Montana 
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TABLE 4.—RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
Agency Title Author Forum 
Tsinghua National 
Laboratory for 
Information Science and 
Technology, Beijing, 
China 
Data Mining Based 
Decomposition for Assume-
Guarantee Reasoning 
He Zhu, Fei He, William 
Hung, Xiaoyu Song, Mig Gu 
Formal Methods in Computer-Aided 
Design, 2009. FMCAD, November 2009, 
Austin, Texas 
Office national d’etudes 
et de recherches 
aerospatiales (ONERA), 
the French Aerospace 
Lab, Meudon, France 
A Framework for 
Heterogeneous Formal 
Modeling and Compositional 
Verification of Avionics 
Systems 
Yamine Ait-Ameur, Remi 
Delmas, Virginie Weils 
International Conference on Formal 
Methods and Models for Co-Design, June 
2004, San Diego, California 
NASA, Hampton, 
Virginia 
Baseline Assessment and 
Prioritization Framework for 
IVHM Integrity Assurance 
Enabling Capabilities 
Eric Cooper, Benedetto Di 
Vito, Stephen Jacklin, Paul 
Miner 
June 2009, NASA/TM—2009-215764 
NASA, Mountain View, 
California 
Automated Compositional 
Verification Editorial 
Dimitra Giannakopoulou Editorial in IET Software Journal, 
Volume 4, Issue 3, June 2010,  
p. 179-180 
NASA, Mountain View, 
California 
Compositional Verification for 
Discovering Failures in 
Adaptive Flight Control 
Systems 
Sarah Thompson, Misty 
Davies, Karen Gundy-Burlet 
AIAA InfoTech, November 2009, 
Seattle, Washington 
NASA, Mountain View, 
California 
“Fly me to the Moon.” 
Verification of Aerospace 
Systems 
Dimitra Giannakopoulou 8th IEEE International Conference on 
Software Engineering and Formal 
Methods, May 2010 
NASA, Mountain View, 
California 
Hybrid Decompositional 
Verification for Discovering 
Failures in Adaptive Flight 
Control Systems 
Sarah Thompson, Misty 
Davies, Karen Gundy-Burlet 
AIAA InfoTech, April 2010, Atlanta, 
Georgia 
NASA, Mountain View, 
California 
Interface Decomposition for 
Service Compositions 
Dimitra Giannakopoulou, 
Corina Pasaeanu 
ICSE 2011, Waikiki, Honolulu, May 
2011 
NASA, Mountain View, 
California 
Towards a Compositional SPIN Dimitra Giannakopoulou, 
Corina Pasaeanu 
13th International SPIN Workshop on 
Model checking of Software, Vienna, 
Austria, March 2006 
NASA, Mountain View, 
California 
A Robust Compositional 
Architecture for Autonomous 
Systems  
Guillaume Brat, Ewen Denney, 
Kimberley Farrell, Dimitra 
Giannakopoulou, Ari Jonsson, 
Jeremy Frank, Mark Boddy, 
Todd Carpenter, Tara Estlin, 
Mihail Pivtoraiko 
Aerospace Conference, IEEE 2006, 
March 2006, Big Sky, Montana 
Jet Propulsion Lab, La 
Canada Flintridge, 
California 
A Robust Compositional 
Architecture for Autonomous 
Systems 
Guillaume Brat, Ewen Denney, 
Kimberley Farrell, Dimitra 
Giannakopoulou, Ari Jonsson, 
Jeremy Frank, Mark Boddy, 
Todd Carpenter, Tara Estlin, 
Mihail Pivtoraiko 
Aerospace Conference, IEEE 2006, 
March 2006, Big Sky, Montana 
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TABLE 5.—CURRENT SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH AUTOMATION DESIGN 
Issue Description 
Aircraft automation “The concern is that automation may cause the aircraft to perform in ways that are not understood or [are] 
uncommanded by the flight crew” 
Altitude errors “These can be caused by communication ambiguity, automation issues, pilot monitoring, etc.” 
Human factors–
automation 
“Automation can be misleading in that a compelling interface can lead the operator to believe the operator is 
using the interface properly when in fact they are not. Case in point: ATC [Air traffic Control] sent a data 
link message confirming the route of flight using the wrong format. The ground automation allowed for the 
use of the improper format. No error message was generated by the ground automation. The automation 
onboard the aircraft attempted to process the message as a valid route clearance which caused the navigation 
computer to skip required waypoints in the intended route clearance. Although the new route clearance did 
not load properly the flight crew used common procedures they use to correct similar problems. The 
airborne automation did not generate an error message; it only displayed to the pilots a situation they deal 
with every day. This would not have been an issue except the particular circumstances which led to this 
issue were automation interfaces that were compelling to both the pilot and air traffic controller.” 
Lack of a principled 
approach in developing 
automated systems 
“Too many band aids are placed on automation without sufficient understanding of the risks associated with 
application of the band aid.” 
Overreliance on flight 
deck automation 
“While new pilots have been exposed to and are comfortable with automation and technology, they are also 
potentially more prone to overdependence on these aids and potentially less resilient when emergencies 
arise. Increased integration and complexity means that a failure in one system may result in erroneous 
information propagating to seemingly unrelated systems, leading to pilot confusion or degraded 
performance of flight control systems. Aircraft designers need to assess the ability of the airplane to 
gracefully degrade to a pilot-operated configuration from more automatic modes. To prevent pilots from 
becoming overwhelmed and over reliant on automated systems, the hardware and software will need to be 
designed to keep the pilot appropriately informed using prioritization schemes or adaptive automation.” 
 
TABLE 6.—FUTURE SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH AUTOMATION DESIGN 
Issue Description 
Automation failures “Systems still do not display the ability to fail eloquently. They generally just shut down; this is 
unacceptable for the systems of tomorrow.” 
Ineffective introduction 
of automation and 
software tools 
“Automation has functional logic that can be perceived as strange and unpredictable behavior by humans. 
Adequate design, testing and training will be needed.” 
The Trophy-for-Every-
Child generation 
“There is an ever increasing trend in all industries creating a root cause for multiple safety concerns. 
Modern education has moved away from allowing students to suffer consequences from failure. Therefore, 
many workers in all industries are starting to perform "success-focused" work in the design and 
implementation of transportation systems. "Success-focused" work is assumed to function properly as 
designed or intended. Less thought is being placed on the "what if's" that may occur during the life-cycle 
of a product or operation. An example of such is the increasing number of failures of high energy density 
storage devices. No consideration was given to the effects of failures on the transportation system. Many 
aircraft flight control systems, which are becoming increasingly more neutral to negative in stability, rely 
heavily on software to operate properly. The software safety aspects of design are not sufficiently robust in 
their failure analysis, relying heavily on assumptions made during the design in order to successfully 
achieve a launch of the product by a certain date. However, increased complexity requires increased 
failure analysis. The limits of technology appear to be exceeding the abilities of the current industry 
workforce to envision potential downfalls.” 
Identifying weak 
signals in large 
aviation data sets 
“Inability to identify the weak signals of impending problems in the large data sets that will grow 
exponentially in the future. Analytical methods that are not robust when applied to heterogeneous database 
formats and content. Challenges in integration of legacy and modern data archives.  Identification and 
filtering of erroneous sensor outputs. An effective, proactive, data analysis capability demands that 
erroneous sensor output must be detected and removed from the data stream or flagged prior to application 
of analysis software. Increased complexity and heterogeneity of data will require advance analytical 
capabilities within the assessment platform.” 
Exposure to potential 
third-party hacking 
“Many systems upgrades, as well as air-ground communications, will be performed via software or 
without direct human interaction. The potential exists for external agents to intervene or ‘hack into’ these 
systems.” 
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TABLE 7.—CURRENT SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEM COMPLEXITY 
Issue Description 
Inadequate design 
assurance for complex 
flight critical system 
certification 
“All recently certified transport airplane models have suffered breakdowns of flight critical functions that 
under less benign circumstances would have resulted in a crash. Clearly, the current design assurance 
processes used for certification do not root out design errors and flight critical function failures that have a 
probability of occurrence greater than the allowable 10–9/flight hour.”  
Complexity of design “Answering safety concerns from regulators has resulted in designs that incorporate complexity with 
unknown failure modes regardless of hazard analysis. Increased safety through added complexity usually 
only results in the illusion of added safety.” 
Risks inherent in 
increasingly complex 
systems. 
“New, complex systems may exhibit behaviors that bring up new risks.” 
The impact of future 
system changes on ANS 
[Air Navigation System] 
-wide safety 
“Many changes, such as NextGen and SESAR, modifications in avionics, and other trends will change the 
baseline risk of the ANS [Air Navigation System].”  
Increasing integration 
and complexity of 
systems 
“As system complexity increases, unrelated systems may react in a way that the pilot may not be able to 
properly understand or interpret. As aircraft are equipped with more complex and integrated equipment, 
training needs to be commensurate with the level of complexity. Heterogeneous equipment and the 
emergence of new, highly integrated, ground-based and aircraft-based systems are potential sources for this 
added complexity. There is also a concern that the complexity of a system of systems will exceed our ability 
to truly understand its characteristics and mitigate safety problems produced by the complexity itself. 
Addressing organizational considerations implicit within a complex, automated system with multiple 
interacting agents across highly heterogeneous levels is a current challenge. The civil aviation infrastructure 
is extraordinarily dependent on computer-telecommunications information systems. Some of the most 
prominent and widely used systems include those for ATC [Air Traffic Control], navigation, reservations, 
and aircraft flight control. Increasingly, these information systems have become critical to the spectrum of 
activities in aviation.” 
Resilience “In introducing automation support to ATC [Air Traffic Control] in the form of tools or procedures, further 
research is needed on what the system needs to remain resilient. The complexity of the system (not 
necessarily for the ATCo [Air Traffic Controller] or the pilot) should not be increased without modeling 
what is needed in terms of redundancy.” 
The continued 
innovation, 
development, and 
integration of automation 
and safety enhancing 
technology into GA 
[general aviation] 
aircraft.  
“[Organization] has seen marked improvements in automation in aviation applications, which has led to 
significant safety enhancements. However, the complexity of these automated systems has also led to 
difficulties in certification, human machine interface, and operational reliability in some cases. 
[Organization] is committed to continuously improving our [development] processes for highly complex 
systems and our procedures for evaluating and improving the human-machine interface to reduce crew 
workload and confusion. We are also working to [improve] the testing and evaluation of complex systems to 
improve operational reliability, availability, accuracy, and ease of use.” 
Overreliance on flight 
deck automation 
“While new pilots have been exposed to and are comfortable with automation and technology, they are also 
potentially more prone to overdependence on these aids and potentially less resilient when emergencies 
arise. Increased integration and complexity means that a failure in one system may result in erroneous 
information propagating to seemingly unrelated systems, leading to pilot confusion or degraded 
performance of flight control systems. Aircraft designers need to assess the ability of the airplane to 
gracefully degrade to a pilot-operated configuration from more automatic modes. To prevent pilots from 
becoming overwhelmed and over reliant on automated systems, the hardware and software will need to be 
designed to keep the pilot appropriately informed using prioritization schemes or adaptive automation.” 
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TABLE 8.—FUTURE SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEM COMPLEXITY 
Issue Description 
System will not be 
coherent in deployment 
“It will be a patchwork of different complex systems without a proper systemic safety approach. The human 
(ATCo [Air Traffic Controller]) will be used to mitigate ” 
System vulnerability “System design appears very complex.” 
Complex system 
interactions 
“The existing level of complexity of aircraft systems has sometimes led to inappropriate crew actions 
because they do not comprehend the actions being driven by automated systems. This concern will grow as 
both aircraft systems and air traffic management systems become more highly automated and interactive.” 
Inadequate attention to 
the human factors 
considerations and 
interactions of air-
ground automation 
“Various proposals are on the table to change the roles and responsibilities for airborne separation, merging, 
and spacing. These involve automation aids in the flight deck and at ATC [Air Traffic Control] 
workstations. The concern is that the perceptual, cognitive, memory, workload, and communication aspects 
for these software decision support systems have not been given due diligence and that the systems have 
been developed in isolation rather than in an integrated fashion.” 
Integrated information 
systems may allow a 
single entry point to the 
entire ANS [Air 
Navigation System] for a 
hacker 
“Federated systems are only vulnerable by themselves. Integrated information systems may be vulnerable 
throughout.” 
System-wide or net-
centric information 
“Mega systems and SESAR theory” 
 
 
 
TABLE 9.—CURRENT SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SOFTWARE, 
FLIGHT CONTROL, OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION 
Issue Description 
Component failure “The failure of hardware or software that can lead to people being hurt or the loss of an asset.” 
Equipment outage “To do the job efficiently, the equipment must work. Impact on the safety of the operation varies depending 
on what goes out of service. As a general rule any degradation in equipment will affect safety.” 
Adequate aircraft 
performance 
“This includes all aircraft, structural, propulsion, and equipment failures that result in the aircraft not 
completing its flight safely.” 
LOC [Loss of Control] “The aircraft is no longer proceeding on a trajectory desired by the pilot in command. This may have been 
caused by exceeding the normal flight envelope into a stall or below VMC, it may be caused by aircraft or 
flight control system failure, or by extreme weather or turbulence.” 
Inappropriate high 
altitude upset recovery 
techniques 
“Engine/flight control malfunction or other disturbance, resulting in the aircraft departing controlled flight.” 
Overreliance on flight 
deck automation 
“While new pilots have been exposed to and are comfortable with automation and technology, they are also 
potentially more prone to overdependence on these aids and potentially less resilient when emergencies 
arise. Increased integration and complexity means that a failure in one system may result in erroneous 
information propagating to seemingly unrelated systems, leading to pilot confusion or degraded performance 
of flight control systems. Aircraft designers need to assess the ability of the airplane to gracefully degrade to 
a pilot-operated configuration from more automatic modes.  To prevent pilots from becoming overwhelmed 
and over reliant on automated systems, the hardware and software will need to be designed to keep the pilot 
appropriately informed using prioritization schemes or adaptive automation.” 
UAS [Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems] 
“UAS [Unmanned Aircraft Systems] and their introduction to daily ANS [Air Navigation System] 
operations; malfunctioning of software and "hacking" of UAS [Unmanned Aircraft Systems] in mid-flight” 
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TABLE 10.—FUTURE SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SOFTWARE, 
FLIGHT CONTROL, OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION 
Issue Description 
Dependency on 
technology  equipment 
failure 
“As added levels of technology interface with aviation, the probability of failures of the automation or 
terrorist cyber-attacks increase. What would happen if all the CNS [Communication, Navigation, and 
Surveillance]/ATM [Air Traffic Management] systems went down in a planned terrorist attack? Are 
sufficient contingencies and security measures in place to protect us from the ever changing security 
threats?” 
Highly integrated critical 
systems relying on 
redundant identical 
technology 
“Critical inputs from sensors that are redundant but suffer from common cause environmental failures can 
create a complex situation for the crew to understand and manage while navigating in the new environment 
with possible degradation to the navigation systems.” 
 
 
 
TABLE 11.—FUTURE SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH NEW TECHNOLOGY OR OPERATIONS 
Issue Description 
New technology “Data link, satellites, fiber optics, etc.” 
New operations “Precision RNAV [Area Navigation], Basic RNAV [Area Navigation], continuous descents, etc.” 
Inability to introduce 
innovations 
“Due to the high cost, time required, and difficulty of doing safety assurance of new technologies, potential 
safety solutions may not be introduced” 
New systems “NextGen/SESAR interface” 
New CNS 
[Communication, 
Navigation, 
Surveillance]/ATM [Air 
Traffic Management] 
developments 
“New operational concepts and systems introduced by NextGen/SESAR” 
As yet unidentified 
factors 
“With widespread changes in infrastructure, aircraft, environmental constraints, and economic pressure, 
changes may be implemented without sure knowledge of their impact.” 
 
 
 
TABLE 12.—CURRENT SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
Issue Description 
Established safety 
assessment techniques 
fall short in safety 
validation of NextGen 
and SESAR 
developments 
“The established safety assessment techniques are able to evaluate local functionality, but not overall 
functionality for a system as complex as ATM [air traffic management] is. The consequence is that [with] 
continued use of established safety assessment techniques, safety risks at overall functionality level do not 
become visible during the design phases, but only when everything is in operation. Identification and repair 
of the problems at such [a] late phase may be extremely costly (in economic terms and in terms of loss of 
lives).” 
Overreliance on flight 
deck automation 
“While new pilots have been exposed to and are comfortable with automation and technology, they are also 
potentially more prone to overdependence on these aids and potentially less resilient when emergencies 
arise. Increased integration and complexity means that a failure in one system may result in erroneous 
information propagating to seemingly unrelated systems, leading to pilot confusion or degraded performance 
of flight control systems. Aircraft designers need to assess the ability of the airplane to gracefully degrade to 
a pilot-operated configuration from more automatic modes.  To prevent pilots from becoming overwhelmed 
and over reliant on automated systems, the hardware and software will need to be designed to keep the pilot 
appropriately informed using prioritization schemes or adaptive automation.” 
Integration techniques “Directed activity that significantly improves integration techniques for airplane impact of common cause 
failures needs to take place. Currently, these integration techniques are not fully coordinated, resulting in late 
design changes, certification difficulties, and the potential release of unmitigated common cause failures in 
service.” 
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TABLE 12.—CURRENT SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
Issue Description 
Verification and 
validation for large 
complex systems, or 
systems of systems 
“As systems become larger and more complex the cost of verification and validation using traditional 
techniques becomes prohibitively expensive. There also needs to be a way to understand the safety 
implications of introducing a new system in to a large existing system.” 
Lack of a principled 
approach in developing 
automated systems 
“Too many band aids are placed on automation without sufficient understanding of the risks associated with 
application of the band aid.” 
Potential risks from new 
and novel designs and 
design features 
“Regulations developed to help ensure aircraft safety may not be adequate.” 
 
 
 
TABLE 13.—FUTURE SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
Issue Description 
Reliability and 
redundancy of satellite-
based navigation 
systems 
“[Association] is concerned about vulnerability of the GPS [Global Positioning System] satellite 
constellation to solar flare activity, hacking/sabotage, and or nuclear threats to global security 
(electromagnetic wave propagation, etc.)” 
Reliability and 
redundancy of satellite-
based navigation 
systems 
“Reliability and susceptibility to jamming, interference, degradation, etc.” 
Ability to produce 
required functionality 
and reliability in new 
systems 
“Many new systems are being put in place. These concerns are about functionality requirements and, 
especially, reliability requirements being integrated with acquisitions.” 
Safe, reliable and 
affordable flexible 
separation management 
“Given the occasional system-wide disruptions that impact [Air Navigation Service Provider] computers, 
how can we be confident of error-free traffic separation in an RVSM [Reduced Vertical Separation Minima] 
and RNAV [Area Navigation] RNP [Required Navigation Performance] environment? How resistant will 
these decision-support systems be to cyber-attack? Will this be an autonomous "smart" system or will human 
intervention be possible or necessary?” 
Safe, reliable and 
affordable flexible 
separation margins. 
“[Organization] is concerned about the reliability of the air traffic system and the possibility that outages will 
adversely impact in flight separation margins” 
Verification and 
validation for large 
complex systems or 
systems of systems 
“As systems become larger and more complex the cost of verification and validation using traditional 
techniques becomes prohibitively expensive. There also needs to be a way to understand the safety 
implications of introducing a new system into a large existing system.” 
Both the ANSP [Air 
Navigation Service 
Provider] and the ANS 
[Air Navigation System] 
user will increasingly 
depend on automation. 
“What type of validation and verification certification testing, and life cycle maintenance validation and 
verification will be used on both aircraft and ANSP automation system to assure continued airworthiness of 
total system.” 
Requirements for off-
nominal operations 
“Future systems will be designed for optimum conditions. How will designs assure safety is maintained 
when either systems fail or there are external hazards: weather, wind gusts, sabotage, etc.” 
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TABLE 14.—NUMBER OF CURRENT AND FUTURE BIENNIAL NextGen SAFETY ISSUES 
THAT COULD BE IMPACTED BY COMPOSITIONAL VERIFICATION IMPLEMENTION 
Category Current Future Total 
Automation design 5 5 10 
System complexity 8 6 14 
Software, flight control or equipment failure or malfunction 7 2 9 
New technology or operations 0 6 6 
Verification and validation 6 8 14 
 
 
 
TABLE 15.—JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS 
 AND RELATED ENABLERS 
OI ID OI Name Description Related 
enablers 
ID 
Related  
enabler name 
OI-3004 Improved 
operational 
processes using 
the safety 
management 
system (SMS)  
“The risk of incidents and accidents is reduced by the systematic 
application of standardized safety management processes throughout 
government and industry. Through a Safety Management System (SMS) 
construct, organizations will speak the same language regarding safety; 
safety management processes, tools, and information will be aligned 
within and among all aviation participants; and organizations will share 
risk mitigation solutions. This OI provides a consistent approach to 
achieve an acceptable level of safety risk in the operation of aircraft, 
certification of procedures and equipment, the conduct of maintenance, 
etc., and establishes the mechanisms necessary to deliver and monitor 
safety performance.” 
EN-3018  Safety 
management 
requirements 
OI-3102 Improved safety 
for NextGen 
evolution 
“This OI mitigates safety risk associated with the evolution of NextGen by 
providing enhanced safety methods that support making changes to the air 
transportation system (ATS), including: advanced capabilities for 
integrated, predictive safety assessment; improved validation and 
verification (V&V) processes supporting certification; an enhanced focus 
on safe operational procedures; and enhanced training concepts for safe 
system operation. Developers discover and mitigate hazards more quickly 
allowing the flying public and ATS stakeholders to experience a safety 
benefit through more rapid and reliable implementation of NextGen 
systems. An advanced integrated, predictive safety assessment capability 
will ensure the management of safety risk associated with complex 
systems and interactions between these systems. It will involve the 
monitoring of system safety performance to accelerate the detection of 
unrecognized safety risks and thus contribute to overall safer operational 
practices. Improved V&V processes will ensure that systems are certified 
to be reliable enough to perform automated operations, to include 
recovery from critical failures, without compromising safe operations. 
Automated operations are necessary to achieve ATS efficiency and 
capacity benefits. As particular operations become more automated, newly 
developed operational procedures that involve human interaction must be 
optimized with assurance that an acceptable level of safety is maintained. 
Additionally, advanced training concepts will maintain levels of 
proficiency for humans to conduct safe operations in place of degraded or 
failed automation.” 
EN-3107  Advanced 
capabilities for 
integrated, 
predictive safety 
assessment 
EN-3050 Advanced 
complex system 
validation and 
verification 
methods 
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TABLE 15.—JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS 
 AND RELATED ENABLERS 
OI ID OI Name Description Related 
enablers 
ID 
Related  
enabler name 
OI-3104 Enhanced safety 
of airborne 
systems 
“Safety requirements are integrated into the development and 
implementation of NextGen advancements for aircraft, to maintain or 
improve safety as changes are introduced. The reliability and 
airworthiness of aircraft is improved at the sub-system level; vehicle 
systems health management is improved at the sub-system and system 
level. The reliability and accuracy of operational information sourced 
from vehicle systems is improved. Aircraft conformance to more stringent 
operational requirements is improved, and aircraft system contributions to 
crash survivability are enhanced.” 
EN-3057 Improved vehicle 
systems health 
management–
Level 2 
EN-3058 Increased 
reliability and 
accuracy of data 
and information–
Level 1 
EN-3059 Increased 
reliability and 
accuracy of data 
and information–
Level 2 
EN-3113 Improve 
reliability and 
airworthiness of 
aircraft 
OI-3105 Enhanced safety 
of ground-based 
systems 
“Safety requirements are integrated into the development and 
implementation of NextGen advancements for ground-based systems, to 
maintain or improve safety as changes are introduced. Ground-based 
systems health management is improved at the sub-system and system 
level. Ground-based systems support more stringent operational 
requirements, and contribute to enhanced crash survivability.” 
EN-3066 Improved 
ground-based 
systems health 
management–
Level 1 
EN-3067 Improved 
ground-based 
systems health 
management–
Level 2 
OI-3108 Safety assurance 
processes and 
tools 
“The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) members and the 
organizations they oversee demonstrate continuous improvement in the 
processes, tools, and procedures associated with safety management 
through incorporation of lessons learned and best practices in the 
implementation of the national Safety Management System (SMS) 
Standard ensuring the continuous improvement of safety. SMS practices 
(e.g., safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety 
promotion) are more effective as improvements are institutionalized after 
initial SMS implementation. Overall safety of national aviation system-
wide processes is improved.” 
EN-3027 Improved fault 
management 
EN-3102 Safety risk 
management 
processes and 
tools 
EN-3103 Safety assurance 
processes and 
tools 
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TABLE 16.—JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE ENABLERS 
ID Number Name Description 
EN-3018 Safety management 
requirements 
“A systematic approach to safety management, which has as its cornerstones safety policy, Safety 
Risk Management (SRM), safety assurance, and safety promotion, provides a deliberate process 
for ensuring system safety. Generally referred to as a Safety Management System (SMS), the 
integrated elements of this systematic approach establish safety accountability at all levels within 
an organization, using quality management principles to identify and control safety risk. The SMS 
will promote the understanding, measurement, and improvement of the organization's safety 
culture. Providing a consistent framework for SMS throughout the government and industry will 
allow the creation of a system of SMS systems which will support the establishment of 
accountability at all levels within the Air Transportation System (ATS) and reliance on the 
cornerstones identified above for safety management. Requirements for safety policy with 
appropriate organizational support will be promulgated through the establishment of a National 
SMS Standard. In addition, the national SMS Standard will facilitate alignment and integration of 
SMSs at the national level.” 
EN-3027 Improved fault 
management 
“Fault management involves both prevention of and preparation for faults and failures. Planning 
for successful mitigation and management of these occurrences, and creating plans for system 
continuity, despite failures, contributes to a safe system. Tools and processes are needed that 
focus on managing the systemic impact of off-nominal conditions, and on developing a greater 
understanding of the propagation of fault and failure effects through systems. Implementation of 
fault prevention, fault tolerance, and fault recovery tools and processes will increase the 
robustness of the NextGen system by enabling tolerance of non-ideal conditions without 
compromising safety. The tools and processes will include linkages to the design assumptions in 
the enterprise and system architectures. These architectures will be analyzed for their potential for 
system risk propagation and designs will be recommended that make the system less likely to 
propagate risk.” 
EN-3050 Advanced complex 
system validation and 
verification methods 
“Advanced tools and processes are developed to improve the verification and validation of 
complex systems and software. Improvements will focus on reducing the time and resources 
needed to conduct validation and verification as well as improving the quality of the results. The 
advanced tools and processes will be created using the combined results of analysis, research and 
development. Advanced tools and processes such as fast time, real time, and human in the loop 
simulations will be used to test and evaluate complex systems and software. They will replace and 
substitute for exhaustive testing. The tools and processes will provide estimates of system risks 
associated with complex system and software deployment. They will use standards protocols for 
system simulation and support the creation of a standard protocol for implementation. The tools 
and processes will establish the minimum acceptability criteria and risk standards applied for 
Validation and Verification (V&V).” 
EN-3056 Improved vehicle 
systems health 
management–Level 1 
“As design guidelines are developed (continuous), implement technologies that reduce systems 
failures or impact of failures that occur. An important part of the aircraft is the vehicle health 
monitoring system. Advanced monitoring systems will integrate information from various sensors 
to not only identify and mitigate sub-system failures, but send information to dispatch and 
maintenance so that trends may be assessed to avert potential failures. The performance measure 
is reduced systems failures or reduced impact of those failures that occur. (Level 1 - less difficult 
improvements, component level).” 
EN-3057 Improved vehicle 
systems health 
management–Level 2 
“As design guidelines are developed (continuous), implement technologies that reduce systems 
failures or impact of failures that occur. An important part of the aircraft is the vehicle health 
monitoring system. Advanced monitoring systems will integrate information from various sensors 
to not only identify and mitigate sub-system failures, but send information to dispatch and 
maintenance so that trends may be assessed to avert potential failures. The performance measure 
is reduced systems failures or reduced impact of those failures that occur. (Level 2 - difficult 
improvements, total vehicle health)” 
EN-3066 Improved ground-
based systems health 
management–Level 1 
“As design guidelines are developed (continuous), implement and deploy technologies that reduce 
systems failures or impact of failures that occur. These ground-based systems will manage 
information flow, aid in decision-making, and perform monitoring functions to reduced systems 
failures or reduced impact of failures that occur. (Level 1 - less difficult improvements, 
component level) 
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TABLE 16.—JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE ENABLERS 
ID Number Name Description 
EN-3067 Improved ground-
based systems health 
management–Level 2 
“As design guidelines are developed (continuous), implement and deploy technologies that reduce 
systems failures or impact of failures that occur. These ground-based systems will manage 
information flow, aid in decision-making, and perform monitoring functions to reduced systems 
failures or reduced impact of failures that occur. (Level 2 - difficult, system level, new design)” 
EN-3058 Increased reliability 
and accuracy of data 
and information–
Level 1 
“As design guidelines are developed (continuous), implement and deploy technologies that reduce 
data acquisition, processing and display errors. These technologies will increase the reliability and 
accuracy of data/information, with a performance measure of reduced data acquisition, 
processing, and display errors. (Level 1 - less difficult improvements, component level)” 
EN-3059 Increased reliability 
and accuracy of data 
and information–
Level 2 
“As design guidelines are developed (continuous), implement and deploy technologies that reduce 
data acquisition, processing and display errors. These technologies will increase the reliability and 
accuracy of data/information, with a performance measure of reduced data acquisition, 
processing, and display errors. (Level 2 - difficult, system level, new design)” 
EN-3102 Safety risk 
management 
processes and tools 
“Improvements to Safety Risk Management (SRM) processes and tools result from research into 
analysis methods, risk estimation techniques, fault management, and other aspects of SRM. 
Routinizing SRM processes and reducing the SRM cycle time will reduce the potential for 
recurrence of incidents and accidents from known risks.” 
EN-3103 Safety assurance 
processes and tools 
“Improvements to safety assurance processes and tools result from research into safety monitoring 
methods, unexposed risk surveillance techniques, comprehensive logical modeling and simulation 
to determine the contribution of singular actions to system-level risk outcomes, and methods to 
extract context from textual data, synthesize data from numerous diverse databases, and quantify 
causal relationships.” 
EN-3107 Advanced 
capabilities for 
integrated, predictive 
safety assessment 
“Current Safety Risk Management (SRM) practices focus on ensuring the safety of individual 
elements of systems, but not on the aviation system as a whole. The underlying assumption in this 
approach is that, if each component of the system is shown to have acceptable risk, the system as 
a whole will have acceptable risk. This assumption is invalid, especially for complex systems 
where interactions between elements occur on multiple levels. Characterizing direct and indirect 
system interactions can help to promote a greater understanding of system of systems behaviors. 
New assessment techniques are needed to consider safety from a macro perspective to ensure that, 
as systems become more complex, our understanding of and ability to manage system safety risk 
is maintained or enhanced. Rapid prototyping of complex systems is a critical component of this 
macro-level understanding, permitting system developers to engage in full mission simulation, 
helping the identification of system safety considerations. Ultimately, adaptation of analytic tools 
used to consider system-wide interactions is needed to monitor system safety performance in real 
or near-real time to speed the discovery of emergent system safety risks. While these tools may 
provide early detection of system safety risks, they will not be able to predict them. Work is also 
needed to develop reliable predictions of system safety risk based on individual behaviors, both in 
nominal and in off-nominal conditions, within the system. Although prediction for human 
behavior is less reliable than for technology, reasonable estimations of human performance can be 
simulated to determine whether the system meets an acceptable level of risk.” 
EN-3113 Improve reliability 
and airworthiness of 
aircraft 
“Increase the reliability of control, avionics, and Information Management Systems (IMS), as well 
as the long-term structural airworthiness of new materials and advanced aircraft designs. The 
result will be reduced systems failures and reduced diversions or incomplete missions.” 
 
 
 
TABLE 17.—NUMBER OF CURRENT AND FUTURE BIENNIAL NextGen SAFETY ISSUES 
THAT COULD BE IMPACTED BY COMPOSITIONAL VERIFICATION IMPLEMENTION 
Category Current Future Total 
Automation design 5 5 10 
System complexity 8 6 14 
Software, flight control or equipment failure or malfunction 7 2 9 
New technology or operations 0 6 6 
Verification and validation 6 8 14 
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TABLE 18.—JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE INTEGRATED WORK PLAN ELEMENTS THAT 
COULD BE IMPACTED BY COMPOSITIONAL VERIFICATION IMPLIMENTATION 
Element ID Element Name 
Capability N/A Provide improved safety operations 
Research action R-1440 Applied research on complex systems validation and verification 
Operational improvement OI-3004 Improved operational processes using the safety management system (SMS) 
 OI-3102 Improved safety for NextGen evolution 
 OI-3104 Enhanced safety of airborne systems 
 OI-3105 Enhanced safety of ground-based systems 
 OI-3108 Improved SMS standards and effectiveness 
Enabler EN-3018 Safety management requirements 
 EN-3027 Improved fault management 
 EN-3050 Advanced complex system validation and verification methods 
 EN-3056 Improved Vehicle Systems Health Management–Level 1 
 EN-3057 Improved Vehicle Systems Health Management–Level 2 
 EN-3066 Improved ground-based systems health management–Level 1 
 EN-3067 Improved ground-based systems health management–Level 2 
   
 EN-3058 Increased reliability and accuracy of data and information–Level 1 
 EN-3059 Increased reliability and accuracy of data and information–Level 2 
 EN-3102 Safety Risk Management Processes and Tools 
 EN-3103 Safety assurance processes and tools 
 EN-3107 Advanced capabilities for integrated, predictive safety assessment 
 EN-3113 Improve reliability and airworthiness of aircraft 
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